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Hitchens and Maher



Some "gloating" from Hitchens. But Hitchens is correct - this is going to get worse and worse, I'm afraid.

Comments

Paul P. Mealing said…
Hitchens is right about the Vatican being its own state - a point that many people overlook. I'm led to believe that the Vatican does not come under the jurisdiction of Italian law. So even if someone is suspected of murder they can't be investigated. And, as Hitchens points out, child abuse is generally considered as being in an even lower category of evil, even amongst criminals.

On his last point about overseas occupations, you may want to listen to this interview with David Kilcullen back in January, who has worked with the American State department.

He also makes the point that we should be providing aid to countries to solve their own problems rather than direct intervention. He says: "We need to get out of the business of invading other people's countries." Though he does give the caveat of saying: "I'd never say never."

Regards, Paul.
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campbell said…
I'm led to believe that the Vatican does not come under the jurisdiction of Italian law. So even if someone is suspected of murder they can't be investigated.



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